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S
tarting in 2014, we’ve seen an in-
creasing number of cyberattacks 
targeting all sorts of organizations. 
These have cost the U.S. economy bil-
lions of dollars and exposed the private 
data of millions of individuals. 
While most of them are designed to 
steal trade secrets, credit card informa-
tion, or even celebrities’ personal infor-
mation, there are still other attacks 
targeting individuals and small orga-
nizations with the sole goal of spread-
ing malware and promoting shady busi-
nesses. This is URL injection.
The experience of the University of 
Missouri–Kansas City’s School of Law 
falls under the latter scenario. Re-
cently, the school experienced a cyber-
attack, and its website was breached. 
No private or critical information was 
exposed. Nevertheless, our newly de-
signed website was compromised, and 
our search engine ranking was nearly 
damaged. Thanks to our security team’s 
quick response, we avoided a disaster 
and a public embarrassment. 
The purpose of this article is to share 
our experience with this type of hacking, 
to describe its scope, to suggest how to 
avoid it, and—if you fall victim to it—
how to clean up the mess it leaves behind 
in your server and in search engines.
About the UMKC School of Law
The School of Law works closely with 
and abides by the governing rules of both 
the University of Missouri–Kansas City 
(UMKC) and the University of Missouri 
System. When it comes to technology 
and infrastructure, we are required to 
get the approval of the main campus IT 
services department for any connected 
devices to make sure they successfully 
pass the school’s security requirements. 
BEFORE WE KNEW IT, 
WE HAD SEVERAL 
CORE WORDPRESS 
FILES COMPROMISED, 
AND ADDITIONAL 
FILES WERE 
INJECTED THROUGHOUT 
THE SERVER.
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Additionally, our law library’s IT staffers 
support all the technology needs of the 
School of Law, including various devices 
and programs used by faculty members, 
staffers, and students, as well as our 
storage, intranet, and web servers. 
The School of Law’s previous website, 
designed and built by the main campus’ 
communications department, was rath-
er new. It featured a clean design and 
organization. However, what started as 
a marketing tool to promote the school 
and its services became more of a re-
pository for current students’ data and 
information. Hundreds of static pages 
went out of control, as new content was 
being added daily, making the naviga-
tion harder for us and our visitors. 
In 2013, the school adopted a new 
intranet system as its main internal 
communication channel as well as the 
school’s learning management system. 
This initiative was soon followed by a de-
cision to remove all the active students’ 
related material, and information hosted 
on our website was to be made available 
exclusively in our intranet system.
The New Website
In late 2013, we started planning for 
a new website. After consulting with 
the campus’ communications depart-
ment and IT services, we decided to 
use WordPress as our CMS to build the 
new website. WordPress was supported 
by the university, and a couple of other 
schools had already migrated their static 
websites to it.
While most of these existing web-
sites were hosted on the university’s 
Linux servers, ours was going to be 
hosted on our virtual server running 
Windows’ operating system. Although 
WordPress is fully supported by Win-
dows, the installation and configuration 
of the server are noticeably different 
and require more resources. 
Our new WordPress website was 
first built in a development server 
while the law school’s communication 
director was working on a new design 
and gathering new and updated con-
tent from the different stakeholders. 
When we approached our launch date, 
we decided to move the new website 
to the live server in a subfolder, while 
keeping the old website active. By do-
ing so, we had enough time to set up 
the server and switch to the new web-
site without having any down time. 
However, the launch date was delayed 
as more content needed to be added 
and a few design elements needed to be 
changed. On January 5, we launched 
the website. Two weeks later, we received 
an email through Google Webmaster 
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Tools, informing us that our newly de-
signed website was hacked and Google 
might label our site’s pages as hacked.
The URL Injection
URL injection (aka SEO poisoning) 
is a technique used to drive traffic to 
malicious sites by injecting poisoned 
URLs and redirections into legitimate 
websites. 
Most search engines have guide-
lines for acceptable methods to help 
developers better optimize their web-
sites to elevate the ranking of their 
pages in search results. However, 
some search engine optimizers may 
game the system by using different 
techniques (aka Blackhat SEO), such 
as cross-linking pages of the same 
website, “stuffing” webpages with pop-
ular keywords, posting links to a site 
in the comments section of webpages, 
and “link farming,” which consists of a 
group of websites that all link to each 
other (Shinder, 2010). When the goal 
is to drive traffic to a malicious site, it 
becomes SEO poisoning.
SEO-driven attacks use scripting 
languages (typically, PHP) to dynami-
cally generate pages stuffed with popu-
lar keywords and links to be eventually 
crawled and indexed in search engines 
(Howard and Komili, 2010). When visi-
tors click on a poisoned link, they are 
redirected to malicious sites, exposing 
them to malware and viruses. 
In its “Web Application Attack Report 
#5,” Imperva (a cyber and data security 
products provider) found that websites 
running WordPress were attacked 24.1% 
more than websites running on all other 
CMS platforms combined (2014). The 
report also suggests that it is mainly 
due to WordPress’ increasing popularity 
in recent years, which has led to more 
attackers researching and exploiting its 
vulnerabilities.
In our case, we found similar types 
of attacks used to poison our WordPress 
installation, caused by an incorrect con-
figuration of our file structure permis-
sion. Before we knew it, we had several 
core WordPress files compromised, and 
additional files were injected through-
out the server. We also found the above-
mentioned link farming. All of the in-
jected links were using popular brand 
names and popular keywords to drive 
traffic to malicious websites.
For example, the link in Figure 1—
which was placed in the index.php file 
of our theme—will not be displayed 
when rendered in a browser, as it does 
not have a link text element. However, 
search engine crawlers will read the title 
element part, which holds the keywords 
used by the attackers, “Replica Rolex.” 
This simple code, when injected in many 
other pages, will elevate the ranking of 
the targeted URL in search engines. 
Figure 2 shows an example of link 
farming in which links to other com-
promised websites were injected in core 
WordPress files and placed inside a hid-
den div. Hidden div is a common Blackhat 
SEO technique that hides keywords—or, 
as in this case, links—from the visitors 
to a webpage while they remain visible 
to search engine crawlers. 
In other instances, we discovered 
new files in our server named like 
WordPress core files, 
but whose function is 
to generate hundreds of 
other malicious pages 
that, in turn, will be 
indexed in search en-
gines. By limiting the 
search results using 
the keyword “Vuitton” 
to our website only in 
Bing’s search engine, 
Bing returned the re-
sults shown in Figure 3. This result is 
linking to a page that has been auto-
matically generated by the code placed 
in the umk.php file. 
And by limiting the search results us-
ing the keyword “replica” to our website 
only in Google’s search engine, Goolge 
returned the results shown in Figure 
4. In addition, the malicious links were 
not only limited to web results but also 
were found in image results on popular 
search engines. Figure 5 shows the re-
sults of a search within our website in 
Google Images’ search engine.
Figure 1
Figure 4
Figure 2
Figure 5
Figure 3
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The Cleanup
When we first received the note 
informing us that our website was 
hacked, we immediately contacted the 
CIO’s office at the university. The of-
fice quickly had a team working on our 
server. The initial action taken by the 
information security officer was to find 
and close the breach in our server that 
allowed the attack. We then spent sev-
eral hours figuring out the damage and 
cleaning up the files.
The assessment from the security 
team was that the attack seemed to 
have happened months before the offi-
cial launch of the website. It coincided 
with when the website moved from the 
development server to the live server. 
Due to the nature of the attack, it was 
highly probable that it would have left 
some untraceable malicious codes that 
would allow it to happen again. The solu-
tion suggested by our security team was 
to take down the entire server and have 
a clean installation of the website in a 
fresh WordPress environment. However, 
taking the website down for an extended 
period of time was out of question. We 
were in the middle of the school year 
and getting ready to kick off the enroll-
ment process. After discussing it with all 
stakeholders, we decided to stabilize the 
damage while we figured out what to do 
with the server.
In our case, finding suspicious files 
and injected codes wasn’t difficult. Once 
we knew the type of attack we were deal-
ing with, it was evident that the goal was 
to promote web links. We scanned the 
entire server looking for links in places 
they shouldn’t be, such as the upload 
folder. We also scanned and verified 
every single link in our custom files. 
Another action we took was to replace 
all core WordPress files with new ones, 
which left us with the plug-ins and the 
theme files to scan.
Overall, it took almost a week to clean 
up all the files in our server. But we were 
not done. The compromised pages had 
already been crawled and indexed in 
search engines. Although these links 
will eventually be dropped—since the 
pages have been removed from our serv-
er—we needed to clean up our search 
results. Fortunately, we discovered the 
right tools to expedite the process. 
During this phase, we limited our 
task to Google and Bing since they rep-
resent most, if not all, the traffic gen-
erated to our website through search 
engines. Google Webmaster Tools and 
Google Analytics were particularly useful 
as they helped us figure out where the 
traffic to our website was coming from 
and what pages were being indexed. 
Knowing the keywords that generate 
traffic to our website helped us identify 
the pages infected that needed to be re-
moved from our server. Filtering search 
engine results based on these keywords 
in relation to our website helped us iden-
tify the already indexed pages and imag-
es that needed to be removed from search 
engines. Google and Bing have their own 
page removal request forms, and the pro-
cess can be completed in few hours. By 
following this strategy, we were able to 
clean up most of the compromised links 
related to our website in Google and Bing.
During this time, we were closely 
monitoring the performance of our serv-
er in order to identify any anomaly. We 
were mostly looking for any suspicious 
connection, files, or folders that can be 
re-injected.
Conclusion
The big lesson we learned from this 
experience is the need for a healthy cross-
departmental collaboration. Teaming up 
with the main IT and security depart-
ments should have been requested from 
the beginning, even if it meant delaying 
the project a few more weeks or even 
months. But thanks to their alertness 
and expertise, we avoided the worst. 
One month after the incident, we had 
the website running and secure again. 
Another lesson learned is the necessity 
to ensure that the test environment re-
flects the live environment. In our case, 
our development server did not meet the 
ideal requirements to run a dynamic 
website, which led us to resume the de-
velopment in the live environment. No 
website should go to a live server during 
development or before being fully tested 
and audited by personnel different from 
those who built it. Testing the website in 
a development environment would have 
helped us identify the permission errors 
at an early stage and avoid the attack. 
At the same time, hackers are al-
ways searching for vulnerabilities in 
websites and reinventing new ways to 
compromise them. Therefore, it is very 
important to have a fallback plan for 
when such misfortune happens. Having 
a clean backup of our WordPress instal-
lation and database helped us restore 
the website in a short amount of time. 
Keeping a change log was a great way 
to figure out the updates and changes 
we made since the last backup, so it was 
easy to re-create them. 
In the next few weeks, we will start 
the process of migrating the website from 
our Windows platform to a Linux server 
dedicated exclusively to WordPress, to 
be run and maintained by the UMKC’s 
information services department. Our 
task will then be limited to updating our 
content, WordPress installation, and any 
third-party plug-in we use.
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ONE MONTH AFTER  
THE INCIDENT, WE HAD  
THE WEBSITE RUNNING  
AND SECURE AGAIN.
